Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Charles Jacobsen v. Veda Dare and Rick Nebeker :
Reply Brief of Appellants
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James R. Boud;Troy Walker; Ashton, Braunberger & Bond; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Russel A CLine; Michael Crippen; Crippen & Cline; Attorney for Defendants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Jacobsen v. Dare, No. 970630 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1177

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH C O u - * >:f APPEALS
UTAH
DOCUMENT

M,eF

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS K F U

60
AW

CHARLES JACOBSEN as General
Partner of Mobile Park West,
a Utah General Partnership,

DOCKET NO. f ? ^ ^ . ^

Plaintiff and
Appellee,
vs.

Docket No. 970630-CA

VEDA DARE AND
RICK NEBEKER,

Priority No. 15

Defendants and
Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS VEDA DARE AND RICK NEBEKER
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
HONORABLE SHEILA MCCLEVE
DATE OF ORDER:
Case No. 9600013522
Russell A. Cline (4298)
Michael Crippen (4973)
Crippen & Cline
310 So. Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 539-1900
Attorney for Defendants
James R. Boud (A0388)
Troy Walker (7663)
Ashton, Braunberger & Boud
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-0300
Attorney for Plaintiff

Fl'
COURT Or

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES JACOBSEN as General
Partner of Mobile Park West,
a Utah General Partnership,
Plaintiff and
Appellee,
vs.

Docket No. 970630-CA

VEDA DARE AND
RICK NEBEKER,

Priority No. 15

Defendants and
Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS VEDA DARE AND RICK NEBEKER
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
HONORABLE SHEILA MCCLEVE
DATE OF ORDER:
Case No. 9600013522

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
I.

CORRECTION IN FACTS SECTION

II.

THE MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY ACT DOES
NOT PREEMPT THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE

III. THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WHICH
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IV.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED PRIMA FACIE
CASE

V.

RULE 404(b) PROHIBITS THE INTRODUCTION OF
LATER PHOTOGRAPHS

VI.

CONCLUSION

APPENDICES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Cresentwood Village, Inc. vs. Johnson, 909 P.2d 1267
(Utah App. 1995)
Housing Authority of Salt Lake City vs. Delgado
914 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah App. 1996)
MISCELLANEOUS
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-16-11
Model Utah Jury Instruction 26.21
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b)

The trial court errored in granting plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment.

There is a material issue of fact as to

whether defendants substantially complied with the 15-day Notice.
I.

CORRECTION IN FACTS SECTION

Paragraph 2 and 7 of "Facts'' section in appellants' brief
should be corrected as follows (reflecting that the 15-day Notice
was serviced on Veda Dare and Rick Nebeker on November 1, 1996
not October 29, 1996):
2.
On November 1, 1996, All Seasons served Dare and
Nebeker with a "Landlord's 15-day Notice" pursuant to
Section 57-16-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953. (R. 14)
7.
By November 22, 1996, 6 days after the 15-day
Notice had run, Dare and Nebeker had not been able to
complete painting of the shed. Dare and Nebeker had to
wait until the weather was warm enough and dry enough
to paint the shed. When the shed was painted, the rain
streaked the shed and the shed had to be repainted.
(R.193.)
II. THE MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT
THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE.
Plaintiff's sole argument that the doctrine of substantial
performance does not apply to compliance with a 15-day Notice is
Cresentwood Village, Inc. v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 1267 (Utah App.
1995).

Plaintiff claims that in Cresentwood this Court held that

the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act preempted the doctrine of
doctrine of substantial performance as it applies to compliance
with a landlord's "15-day Notice" issued pursuant to the Utah
Mobile Home Park Residency Act. This is absolutely false.
In Cresentwood, this Court held that where a tenant complies
3

with a 15-day Notice, but thereafter repeatedly violates park
rules, the park is not required to give further notice before
bringing an action for eviction.

In Cresentwood, the mobile home

park served a 15-day Notice on a tenant which stated that "should
[the tenant] in the future again violate the above rules or a
different rule of the park, this will result in forfeiture of
your lease and eviction without any further period of cure" Id.
at 1269.

The tenant complied with the 15-day Notice but

thereafter continued to violate park rules.

The plaintiff filed

an action to terminate the lease based on the later violations
without any further cure period.

Defendant argued that, under

common law, the mobile home park was required to give the tenant
an additional notice, although not required by statute, of its
intention to terminate the lease if there were further
violations.

The court held that because the Utah Mobile Home

Park Residency Act did not require any additional notice to be
given, no such notice was required.
Although Cresentwood did not directly address whether the
doctrine of "substantial performance" applies to a 15-day Notice,
indirectly the court acknowledged that it does.

In describing

the trial court's finding that the tenant had complied with the
original 15-day Notice, the Cresentwood Court stated as follows:
Eventually, on May 6, 1993, CVI served
Johnson with a 15-day eviction notice for
rule violations. That notice required
Johnson to cure three violations if she were
4

to avoid eviction. After receiving the
notice, Johnson timely cured the unlicensed
vehicle violation and the mobile home
painting violation. Johnson also
substantially cured the violation related to
the keeping of her lot neat, clean and weed
free, removing most, but not all the garbage
and weeds.
Id. at 221. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the court found that the 15-day Notice had been complied
with, upon a finding that Johnson had removed "most, but not all,
garbage and weeds" and "substantially cured" the violation.
There is no provision in the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency
Act expressly preempting the doctrine of substantial performance
as it applies to compliance with a 15-day Notice.

Furthermore,

the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act specifically provides
that "the rights and remedies as granted by this chapter are
cumulative and non-exclusive." Utah Code Annotated 57-16-11.
As more fully set forth in the Brief of Appellants (see
pages 6-8), substantial performance is the law in the State of
Utah, and should apply to compliance with a 15-day Notice. See
also Appendix A hereto, which is Model Utah Jury Instruction
26.21 —

the substantial performance jury instruction approved

for use in jury trials throughout the State of Utah.
III.

THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The trial court errored in granting summary judgment in this
case inasmuch as there is a material issue of fact in dispute.

5

Because a jury could find that the defendants "substantially
complied" with the 15-day Notice, the trial court errored in
granting summary judgment.
Based on the facts in the record and the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, a jury could reasonably
conclude as follows:
1.
Prior to being served with the 15-day Notice on
November 1, 1996, Rick Nebeker and Veda Dare had lived
in the mobile home park for 18 months, were not late on
rent and did not violate park rules.1
2.
On November 1, 1996, defendants received a 15-day
Notice and immediately and fully complied with five of
the seven items.2
3.
The remaining two items were to have the "shed
painted" and to store items in the back yard and around
the mobile home "in your shed or in your home."3
4.
Upon receiving the 15-day Notice on November 1, 1996,
and prior to the expiration of the 15 days, defendants took
the following actions to comply with these two items:
a.

Purchased paint and paint rollers;4

Plaintiff has not alleged in the Complaint or in the
"Statement of Undisputed Facts" in plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment any previous rule violations or failure to pay rent. (R.
1-3, 110-111.)
2

See R. 188-190. Plaintiff has never alleged that these 5
items were not immediately and timely complied with. (R. 110111.)
3

See R. 15, items 1 and 3.

Pictures E-5, E-8, E-9, and E-10 (R. 157-58) show the paint
and paint roller. Veda Dare testified that "[w]e commenced
[painting] shortly after the 15-day Notice was given, but because
of the rain problem we were not able to complete it within the
15-days but we did complete shortly thereafter." (R. 186) See
also R. 192-93 (Affidavit of Rick Nebeker).

6

b.
Watched and waited until the weather was
warm enough and dry enough to permit
painting;5
c.
Painted the shed, which was streaked by
rain before it could dry;6
d.
Watched and waited until weather
permitted repainting;7
e.
Moved 2 wicker chairs, one table, one
umbrella, one wicker basket and one patio
chair out of the back yard and indoors;8
g.
Obtained permission from park manager to
cover with a tarp certain items that would
not fit in the shed or could not be taken
indoors.9
5.
On November 17, 1996, the day the 15-day Notice
expired, defendants were still trying to repaint the
shed in adverse weather. Once the shed was repainted,
the remaining items in the yard were immediately stored
in the shed and the remaining items were covered with a

5

See paragraph 5 of Veda Dare Affidavit (R. 186) and
paragraph 2 of Rick Nebeker Affidavit (R. 192-93).
6

Id. ("[W]hen it rained the rain would streak the shed and
the shed would have to be repainted.")
7

Id.

8

In comparing Exhibit D-2 (R. 154), taken on October 2,
1996, with Exhibits E-4, E-5, E-6, E-8, E-9 and E-10 (R. 157-58),
taken on November 22, 1996, 2 wicker chairs, one table, one
umbrella, one wicker basket and one patio chair have been moved.
9

Rule 9(c ) of the All Seasons Mobile home Community Good
Neighbor Policy provides that items can be stored in the back
yard if "approved by owner/' In this case, Rick Nebeker
specifically asked for permission to store certain items in the
back yard, covered by a tarp, and the manager consented. "Brenda
Bottoms [the park manager] said that the items could be stacked
by the house and back fence and covered, which they were." (R.
189, 194)

7

tarp, as per permission from the park manager.10
6.
On or shortly after November 23, 1996, 7 days
after the 15-day Notice expired, the repainting of the
shed was completed, the remaining items were either
stored inside or covered with a tarp (pursuant to
permission from the park manager) and all items on the
15-day Notice were complied with.11
7.

On December 6, 1996, the Complaint was filed.12

8.
The February 21, 1997, pictures demonstrate that
everything in the 15-day Notice had been complied
with.13
9.
The May 12, 1997, pictures were taken while
defendants were spring-cleaning their shed and are
irrelevant to anything in this case.14
Attached hereto as Appendix B is an integration of the foregoing
with plaintiff's photographs, demonstrating how the photographs
corroborate the foregoing.
Based on the foregoing, a jury could determine that
defendants had "substantially complied" with the 15-day Notice.
10

See R.

11

Id.

12

See R.

192-93.

1.

13

Exhibits E-4, E-5, E-6, E-8, E-9 and E-10 (R. 157-58) show
that the remaining items in the yard have either been stored or
covered with a tarp (as per agreement with park manager).
14

Exhibits G-l, G-2 and G-3 were taken while defendants were
spring cleaning the shed. "Brenda Bottoms apparently waited
until we were in the process of spring cleaning the shed and then
took these pictures. Roger Strader came over during the course
of one or two days we had pulled everything out of the shed and
then moved everything back into the shed while we were cleaning.
There are pictures of the items that were in the shed when they
were pulled out and we were cleaning the shed." Paragraph 13,
Affidavit of Veda Dare. (R. 188.)
8

The jury could reason that the only breach was a short delay in
complying with two items in the 15-day Notice -- the painting the
shed and storing items in the shed.

In evaluating the "facts and

circumstances/" the jury could find that defendants did
"everything they could to comply" during the 15 days, had only
been barred by weather from timely completing these two items,
and therefore made a "good faith" effort to comply.15
Furthermore, time was not "of the essence" and it was at
plaintiff's request that the outdoor painting was to be done in
November.

The jury could conclude that the items were completed

as soon as weather allowed and this delay was "minor."

The jury

could take into consideration the policy that the law does not
favor forfeitures and will not forfeit a tenant's lease unless
there has been a substantial breach.

See Housing Authority of

Salt Lake City vs. Delgado, 914 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah App. 1996).
A jury could reasonably conclude that Rick Nebeker and Veda Dare
"substantially complied" with the 15-day Notice.

Because a jury

could so conclude, granting summary judgment is error and should
be reversed.

15

See Affidavit of Veda Dare, paragraph 5: "Since the 15-day
Notice requested that we paint the shed we were doing everything
we could to comply. When it rained the rain would streak the
shed and the shed would have to be repainted. We commenced
shortly after the 15-day Notice was given, but because of the
rain problem we were not able to complete it within the 15-days
but we did complete it shortly thereafter."
9

IV.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED PRIMA FACIE CASE.

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff simply
attaches the pictures, with no explanation of what the pictures
mean, what they purport to represent, how they portray rule
violations or any other explanation.

Photographs do not "speak

for themselves" and must be explained.16
V.

RULE 404(b) PROHIBITS THE INTRODUCTION OF LATER PHOTOGRAPHS.
Pursuant to Rule 404 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the

photographs taken after the date the Complaint is filed cannot be
used to establish a violation on the date the Complaint was
filed.

In this case, plaintiff has not introduced any evidence

that there were any violations of the 15-day Notice on the date
the Complaint was filed.

(To the contrary, the next photographs

taken after the date the Complaint was filed, on February 22,
1997, shows that there was full compliance with the 15-day Notice
as of that date.)
VI.

CONCLUSION

Substantial performance is law in the State of Utah.
applies in this case.

It

Furthermore, there is a material issue of

fact as to whether defendants substantially complied with the 15day Notice.

The trial court's granting of plaintiff's Motion for

16

Plaintiff's counsel tries to testify throughout the Brief
of Appellee as to what the pictures represent. Testimony of
counsel is not evidence. Brenda Bottoms' Affidavit only states
that the photographs "show the rule violations complained of on
the 15-day Notice.'' (R. 119) No further explanation is given.
10

Summary Judgment should be reversed and defendants awarded their
attorney's fees.
DATED this

'2Q> day of January, 1998.

ussell A. cil:
.me
Attorney for Veda Dare
and Rick Nebeker

MAILING CERTIFICATE
rtify that on this 2/_day of January, 1998,
This is to cert
)rrect copies of the'foregoing
Appellants Briief
two (2) true and correct
the 'foregoing Appe
were mailed first class, postage prepaid to:
James R. Boud
Troy Walker
Ashton, Braunberger & Boud
302 W. 5400 So., Suite 103
Murray, UT 84107
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26 21

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL

MUJI 26.21
SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE
The plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff substantially
performed the plaintiff's obligation to [describe required
performance of the plaintiff and to whom performance was owed].
Proof of substantial performance means that the plaintiff must
prove all of the following:
1. That the plaintiff performed substantially all of what the
contract required.
2. That the plaintiff's performance was so nearly equivalent to
what was bargained for that it would be unreasonable, based on all
the facts and circumstances, to deny the plaintiff the payment of
the contract price, less any damages for the plaintiff's failure to
perform the remainder of the contract terms.
3. That the plaintiff acted in good faith, and did not
intentionally fail to comply with the terms of the contract.
If you find that the plaintiff has proved all three of these items,
then you must find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the
contract price from the defendant, less any amount owing to the
defendant resulting from the plaintiff's failure to perform all of the
plaintiff's obligations under the contract. If you find that the
plaintiff has not proved all of these items, then you must find the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover the agreed contract price from
the defendant.
References:
IJI §12 02 Reprinted with permission, copyright © 1991 Matthew
Bendei & Co , Inc
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APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY AND EXPLANATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS1

1.

October 2, 1996, photograph of defendants' backyard:

2.
On November 1, 1996, defendants are served with a 15day Notice.
3.
By November 17, 1996, all items are completed except
painting shed and storing items in backyard in shed (or covering
certain items with a tarp, as per manager's consent). Because of
rain streaking the paint and inclement weather, defendants have
not been able to complete these items.

*The citation to the record for the foregoing facts is fully
developed on pages 6-8 of this brief. The Court is generally
referred to the Affidavits of Veda Dare and Rick Nebeker (R. 185194.

4.

November 22, 1996, photograph of defendants' backyard,
a.

6 days after the 15-day Notice expired, defendants

are still

trying

to complete

repainting

of the

shed - pictures show ladder, paint roller and
paint.
b.

The pictures show recent rain.

c.

Note that the two wicker chairs, wicker basket,
table, umbrella and chair shown in the October 2,
1996 picture have all been removed from the yard
and stored.

d.

The only items remaining in the yard are those
that will go in the shed when painting is complete
or that will be covered by a tarp, as per the park
manager's consent.

5.
Shortly after the foregoing pictures were taken (and
prior to the filing of the Complaint), all remaining items in the
15-day Notice were completed, to wit the painting of the shed was
completed, the remaining items in the yard were either covered
with a tarp (as per agreement) or stored in the shed.
6.

On December 12, 1996, the Complaint was filed.

7.

February 21, 1997, photographs of defendants' backyard.
a.

Photographs demonstrate that the 15-day Notice has
been fully complied with.

b.

All items shown in the previous photographs have
either been stored in the shed or covered with a
tarp, as per manager consent.

c.

The "rubbermaid" package is a second shed
purchased by defendants (yet to be assembled) to
store additional items.

?</

May 12, 1997, photographs of defendants' backyard.
a.

Defendants were spring cleaning and had emptied
the shed.

b.

The contents of the shed were out at most 1-2 days
while the shed was cleaned and items organized.

c.

Plaintiffs use these photographs to show
"continuing violations" deliberately misleads the
court.
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